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Many public goods are characterized by rivalry and/or excludability.  This paper introduces 
both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple endogenous growth model.  
We derive the equilibrium growth rate and design the optimal tax and user-cost structure.  
Our results emphasize the role of congestion in determining this optimal financing structure 
and the consequences this has in turn for the government’s budget.  The latter consists of fee 
and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public production input and that may or 
may not suffice to finance the entire public input, depending upon the degree of congestion.  
We extend the model to allow for monopoly pricing of the user fee by the government.  Most 
of the analysis is conducted for general production functions consistent with endogenous 
growth, although the case of CES technology is also considered. 
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 1. Introduction 
A vast literature has evolved emphasizing the role of public investment as a determinant of 
economic growth.  Among the earliest contributions, Arrow and Kurz (1970) is particularly 
significant, while the seminal work of Barro (1990) has been especially influential with respect to 
the contemporary endogenous growth literature.  Stimulated by Aschauer’s (1989) findings 
pertaining to the high rate of return on public capital, several authors have explored various aspects 
of the role of public capital in stimulating economic growth.  For example, Baxter and King (1991) 
and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) examine the interaction between public and private capital in a 
Ramsey-type growth model, while Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) perform a similar type of 
analysis in an endogenous growth context.  Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) analyze the growth 
effects of productive public spending in an overlapping generations setup, extending the framework 
to include majority voting, and alternative compositions of publicly provided goods and services.  
They also indicate private alternatives to public provision, but do not pursue this in detail.  Cassou 
and Lansing (1998) focus on the relationship between private and public capital, showing how the 
evolution of the ratio between the two in the US economy since 1925 is broadly consistent with the 
predictions of a simple Ramsey growth model.  They also show how the productivity slowdown in 
the US economy since the 1970s is more likely due to increasing tax rates than it is to non-optimal 
public investment policy. 
Much of the literature, including Barro, treats the public input as a pure public good, freely 
available without restrictions or impediments to all agents in the economy.  But the public goods 
literature identifies many different characteristics that most public goods in fact exhibit, notably the 
presence of “rivalry” and/or “excludability”; see e.g. Cornes and Sandler (1996).  Thus the treatment 
of a public input as a pure public good is extreme, as has been long acknowledged.
1
In response to this, much of the recent literature analyzing the impact of public expenditure 
and investment on economic growth allows for non-excludable public goods that, because of 
congestion, are nevertheless subject to rivalry.  Several alternative formulations of congestion have 
                                                 
1 For example, Thompson (1974) argues that even national defense, often regarded as the prototypical pure public good, 
is subject to a form of congestion. 
1 been adopted; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Turnovsky 
(1996, 2000), and Eicher and Turnovsky (2000).  In particular, Eicher and Turnovsky emphasize the 
restrictions that must be imposed on the form of congestion function if an endogenous growth model 
is to sustain an equilibrium balanced growth path. 
In addition to rivalry, a second key feature of a many public goods is excludability.  This 
means that individuals have access to the good if and only if they are willing to pay the “user fee” 
for the service it provides.  The costs of using the input may thus be unequivocally assigned to the 
users, something that is not possible for a pure public good, and potential users will be denied access 
to it unless they are willing to pay the necessary fee.  Under this financing scheme market provision 
of the public input is basically possible.  Examples of public goods that are often excludable include: 
highways, schools, universities, national parks, and television, which may require fees or licenses.  
In addition, publicly provided private goods, like water or electric power supply for which 
governments levy user fees, also exist.   
In contrast to the treatment of rivalry, the consequences of excludability of public goods and 
its financing by a user cost, as well as the choice between tax financing and user cost financing for 
economic growth has received little attention, despite its practical importance, particularly in 
European countries.  Ott (2001) focuses on the growth impact of an entirely excludable public 
production input subject to potential congestion.  The optimal financing implications are derived for 
a government that provides the public input at competitive prices.  The monopolistic provision of 
excludable public goods has been discussed by Brito and Oakland (1980), although not in the 
context of growth models.
2
The objective of the present paper is to develop a growth model that includes both excludable 
and non-excludable public goods as productive inputs, both of which may be subject to some degree 
of congestion.  What we have in mind is the following.  A firm, as part of its production process, 
needs to ship its finished output to market.  It has the choice of using a highway, for which it pays a 
user fee, or using a surface road that runs parallel and that is financed out of tax revenues.  The two 
                                                 
2 Other authors who discuss the provision of excludable public goods include Burns and Walsh (1981), Brennan and 
Walsh (1985), and Fraser (1996), although in all cases from a very different perspective from that we shall be adopting. 
2 roads are clearly substitutes in the productive process and the important question is the optimal 
provision of the two forms of public input and their pricing structure.  Two main features distinguish 
our analysis from previous contributions:  first, the introduction of partial excludability of the 
productive public input, and second the possibility of monopolistic pricing by the government in an 
economy experiencing ongoing growth.   
The provision of publicly provided infrastructure characterized by exclusion is quite 
widespread and is therefore a plausible assumption.  Within the European Union, different systems 
for financing infrastructure exist:  While some countries levy highway tolls only on trucks, other 
countries also charge private individuals for their use of the highway.  In addition, toll systems differ 
in their design from country to country:  Some tolls are time-based (e.g. the Euro-Vignette-System in 
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and others are based on distance 
(see e.g. Germany, Austria, Italy or France).  With the introduction of the user fee system in 
Germany, a transition from tax to fee financing for the provision and maintenance of infrastructure is 
put in place.  In addition, though still tentative, the introduction of highway user fees for private 
individuals is under discussion.
3
While in most countries taxation still account for the largest part of government revenues, in 
many countries there has been a recent trend toward more user fees; see e. g. Wassmer and Fisher 
(2002) for the United States or European Commission (2001) for the EU.  One important argument 
advanced in favor of fees is the revenue effect, meaning that they may increase total government 
revenues, thereby reducing the budget deficit and giving the government financial flexibility to 
pursue other goals.  This requires that charging user fees does not simply lead to a different structure 
of government revenues in favor of fees, but in fact, generates additional net revenues.  But even in 
cases where the overall revenues are not necessarily increased, efficiency considerations may still 
induce policy makers to have a preference for one revenue mix over another.
4
                                                 
3 Another important example of infrastructure that is excludable, but nevertheless still predominantly provided by 
governments, is airports.  The structure of airport ownership of in Europe is quite diverse.  While the British Airport 
Authority privatized their entire airport system, on the European continent at most 50% of any airport is owned by 
private agents.  The excludability arises from the need to purchase landing rights to use the airport. 
4 For a discussion of these issues see e.g. Dewees (2002).  Another argument for user fees (not addressed here) pertains 
to a potential incentive effect, whereby the user fee may reduce congestion arising from a suboptimally high usage of the 
public input.    
3   The model we employ is a straightforward extension of the Barro (1990) model, modified to 
include both a conventional non-excludable public input, financed out of tax revenues, plus an 
excludable public input that requires a user fee.  Both goods are rival, which we specify by 
introducing congestion.  Our main results are presented as a series of propositions describing the 
interaction between these two forms of input, both in production, and with respect to their financing. 
  Beginning with a centrally planned economy we derive the first-best optimal shares of the 
two forms of public inputs, as a benchmark.  The first key result is to characterize the structure of the 
optimal income tax and user fee that will replicate the first-best equilibrium.  These are expressed in 
terms of: (i) the partial production elasticities of the two inputs, and (ii) their respective degrees of 
congestion.  We show how the existence of congestion in either input raises the income tax and 
lowers the user fee.  We then briefly turn to the case where the government provides non-optimal 
amounts of the public inputs and characterize the tax-user fee structure that is necessary to correct 
for the two externalities that arise in that case: (i) the non-optimal provision of the public good, and 
(ii) the congestion effects.  
We examine in detail the implications of tax versus user-fee financing for the government’s 
budget.  In particular we find that the user fee will fully finance the excludable input if and only if 
there is no congestion.  Whether or not the total revenue generated – taxes plus user fee – suffice to 
finance the government’s overall budget depends critically upon the degrees of congestion, in both 
types of government input.   
  The fact that the government is the unique supplier of the public input presents it with the 
opportunity to price as a monopolist in the case of the excludable input.  While this turns out to have 
no effect on optimal tax policy, it does have important consequences for the setting of the user fee 
and thus for the overall revenue.  Indeed, we find that it can now fully finance the excludable input 
out of the user fee if the degree of monopoly power equals or exceeds the optimal tax rate. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  After setting out the underlying 
analytical structure in Section 2, the next section derives the equilibrium in the centrally planned 
economy.  Section 4 then derives the equilibrium in the decentralized economy, while Section 5 
provides a general characterization of the optimal tax and pricing policies.  These have consequences 
4 for the government budget and these are spelled out in Section 6. The extension to allow for 
monopoly pricing by the government is undertaken in Section 7.  Until this point our analysis is 
based on the most general production function, consistent with sustaining on-going growth.  All that 
this requires is that it be constant returns to scale in the three productive inputs, private capital and 
the two public inputs.  Section 8 briefly discusses the special case of the constant elasticity of 
substitution production function, thus enabling us to focus explicitly on the role of factor 
substitutability.  Section 9 concludes, while technical details are relegated to the appendix. 
2.  The Analytical Framework 
2.1  Production technology and public inputs 
The economy is populated by n identical individuals who consume and produce a single 
good.  Individual output is determined by privately owned capital, k, and the aggregate flow of 
public services.  The individuals may be excluded from at least a part of these services.  To capture 
the feature of excludability the public input is split in an excludable part,  , and a non-excludable 
component,  .  The individual agent’s production function 
S E
S G
(, , ) SS yF k E G =         ( 1 )  
is homogeneous of degree one in the three inputs.
5 It is assumed that the productive services derived 
by the representative individual from a given amount of public expenditure depend upon the usage 
of his individual capital stock relative to aggregate usage. This describes the situation of relative 
congestion that is introduced via typical congestion functions; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000): 
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5 We assume that labor is supplied inelastically. 
5 where  K nk =  denotes the aggregate stock of private capital.
6  The exponents  E ε  and  G ε  
parameterize the degree of congestion for either component of the public production input.  The case 
0 EG ε ε ==  corresponds to nonrival pure public inputs that, independent of the size of the economy, 
are fully available to each individual.  There is no congestion.  The other limit,  1 EG ε ε == , reflects a 
situation of proportional (relative) congestion.  Given an agent’s individual capital stock, only if E 
and G increase at the same rate as does the economy, as measured by the aggregate capital stock, do 
the levels of service provided to any individual remain constant. The public good is then like a 
private good in that since K nk = , each of the n individuals receives his proportionate share of the 
service;  S EE = n G .
7  The cases 0 1,  0 1 E ε ε < << <  reflect situations of partial (relative) 
congestion, in the sense that given the individual stock of capital, government spending can increase 
at slower rate than does K and still provide a fixed level of services to the firm.
8
2.2  Fiscal instruments and monopoly power 
To finance the provision of the public input the government needs to raise revenues.  Most 
growth models with public inputs assume non-excludability, so that the only way to finance the 
provision of these goods is through taxes.
9  An important feature of the model developed here is that 
the government has at its disposal an additional fiscal instrument.  Because of the possibility of 
exclusion, the government may levy user fees on the individual usage, E, that reflect the price each 
individual has to pay if he decides to employ E for production.  As will be shown later, the optimal 
                                                 
6 Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) discuss at some length alternative specifications of congestion, some of which has its 
genesis in the urban economics literature; see e.g. Edwards (1990).  They draw the distinction between “relative” 
congestion, as specified in (2), and “absolute” congestion, where (2a), for example would be of the form  S EE K
χ − =  
say.  As Eicher and Turnovsky note, since unlike relative congestion, absolute congestion is in general inconsistent with 
endogenous growth, we adopt the specification given in (2).  In this specification, congestion operates through the 
aggregate use of capital, so that as long as agents own capital – and being identical we assume that they all do – 
increasing the number of people in the economy will generate congestion and reduce the services provided by the public 
input.  
7 As a terminological point, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) describe the public service in this case as being excludable. 
8 Although we do not discuss this case, we should not necessarily rule out congestion parameters in excess of unity.  This 
describes a situation where congestion is so great that the public good must grow faster than the economy in order for the 
level of services provided to remain constant.  This case is unlikely at the aggregate level, but may well be plausible for 
local public goods (see Edwards 1990). 
9 See e.g. Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Futagami et al. (1993).  Some analyses also allow for government borrowing, 
which typically is equivalent to lump-sum tax financing; see e.g. Turnovsky (1976), Ireland (1994), and Bruce and 
Turnovsky (1999) 
6 user fee will equal the marginal cost of provision.
10  But one also has to take into account that the 
government might behave as a monopoly in the provision of the excludable public good.  Monopoly 
power is formalized via the degree of monopoly, denoted by ω , that reflects the negative reciprocal 
of the price elasticity of demand for E.  Denoting the user fee by   and the distortionary tax on 
income by 
q
τ , we assume that the government balances its budget at each instant by levying a lump-
sum tax, l, on each individual, in accordance with 
( () nl E G n y nq E D τω =+− + ≡ )        ( 3 )  
where the right hand side of (3) defines the “primary budget deficit”, D.
11  Written this way 
emphasizes the extent to which total government revenues from income taxation plus user fees 
deviates from total expenditures, thus enabling us to consider the revenue effect of the user fee. 
2.3  Aggregate resource constraint   
Output can be either consumed, used for the provision of the public inputs, or accumulated as 
capital. Thus, the aggregate resource constraint is expressed by 
            ( 4 )   nk ny E G nc =− − − 
where c denotes consumption per capita. 
2.4 Welfare 
The agent's lifetime utility is represented by the intertemporal isoelastic utility function that 
depends only on consumption 








− ∞ − ≡
− ∫ d t ,   0,   0 ρ σ >>      (5) 
                                                 
10 Note that all fiscal instruments we consider are constant so that problems of time inconsistent policies do not arise.  A 
discussion of optimal public investment with, and without, government commitment is provided by Azzimonti-Renzo, 
Sarte, and Soares (2003). 
11 We define the term “primary budget deficit” to be government expenditures less tax revenues from current activity.  
Note that D may be positive or negative, depending upon the combination of fiscal instrument chosen.  This terminology 
may differ from other usages that may include tax revenues on government interest payments.  
7 where 1 σ  denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ  is the rate of time preference.  
3. Central  planner 
  As a benchmark, we begin by considering a centrally planned economy in which the decision 
maker can choose the resource allocation directly.  To sustain an equilibrium of ongoing growth, 
both types of government expenditures must be tied to the scale of economy.  This can be achieved 
most conveniently by assuming that the government sets its expenditures for E and G as fractions of 
aggregate output,Y , namely  n y ≡
E eY =    0 e 1 < <      ( 6 a )  
Gg Y =    0 g 1 < <      (6b) 
An expansion in government expenditure is parameterized by increases in the expenditure shares, e 
and g.  We analyze the case in which the government acts as a benevolent social planner, that 
determines consumption, the rate of capital accumulation, and both public inputs, to maximize the 
intertemporal utility function of the representative agent, (5), subject to the capital accumulation 
equation, (4).  The social planner is aware of any possible congestion effects, thus internalizing the 
link between individual and aggregate capital, K nk = . Using this relationship, the congestion 
functions (2) become 
E
S EE n
ε − =  and 
G
S GG n
ε − = , and together with equations (2) and (6), the 
production function (1) can be rewritten as 
1 1 (, , ) (, , )
G EE y F k En Gn F k eyn gyn
ε εε − −− ==
G ε −
) k
     (7) 
As a consequence of the homogeneity assumption, the equilibrium individual production function as 
perceived by the central planner turns out to be linear in capital and thus, for appropriate preferences, 
can sustain an equilibrium of ongoing growth.
12  The equilibrium production function is given by 
      
1 1 (,
G E ye ng n
ε ε φ
− − = 12 0, 0 φ φ >>      ( 8 )    
                                                 
12 The relationship between the basic production function, (1), and the “AK form”, (8), is discussed in the Appendix.  
8 where  φ , which reflects both the marginal and average productivity of capital, is an increasing 
function of both public inputs.   
  We find it advantageous to conduct the social planner’s optimization problem in two stages.  
We first determine the equilibrium in which the expenditure shares, e and g, are set arbitrarily while 
in the second stage e and g are set optimally, along with individual consumption and capital 
accumulation.  By first setting the expenditure shares arbitrarily, enables us to establish the 
relationship between government expenditure and the equilibrium growth rate, clearly an important 
relationship in its own right, and one that has been widely studied both theoretically and empirically.  
Second, knowing what happens when expenditure shares are set arbitrarily facilitates our 
understanding of optimal expenditure policy.  From equations (12) and (14) below, for example, it 
becomes clear what the policy maker needs to do in order to achieve the optimal growth rate or to 
maximize welfare (which coincide in this case), and which externalities the optimal policy is 
correcting.  If we restricted our attention to the optimal policies alone these insights would be lost.  
We shall refer to the equilibrium in which e and g are set arbitrarily as being the “second-best 
equilibrium” and the case where e and g are chosen optimally, as being the “first-best equilibrium”. 
3.1  Arbitrarily set fractions of e and g (second best optimum) 
If the planner sets the expenditure parameters e and g arbitrarily, the optimization problem is 
simply to maximize welfare (5) subject to the resource constraint 
            ( 4 ’ )   (1 ) ke g y =− − −  c
where y is given by equation (8).  Optimizing over consumption, c, and capital, k leads to the 
standard optimality conditions 
    c
σ λ
− =         ( 9 a )  











        ( 9 b )  
where λ  denotes the shadow price of capital.  Equation (9a) equates marginal utility to the shadow 
value of an additional unit of capital, λ , while equation (9b) equates the social rate of return on 
9 capital to the rate of return on consumption.  Combining (9a) and (9b) the second-best equilibrium 
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G E eg e n g n
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  Differentiating (10) with respect to e and g, respectively, we obtain 
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       (11b) 
where , , kEG η ηη are the elasticities of output as specified by (1) with respect to the three productive 
factors,  , respectively.  Setting equations (11) to zero, we see that the growth-maximizing 
shares of the two types of public input are given by 
,, kEG
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where  , eg η η  are the elasticities of output with respect to the shares of the two forms of public input, 
e, g, respectively.
14  Thus increasing either form of government expenditure will increase the growth 
rate until its share of output equals its corresponding productive elasticity.  It is important to 
emphasize that except for the Cobb-Douglas production function, these production elasticities are 
not constant but vary with the public inputs, E and G, as well as with other parameters.
15  This 
relationship will become apparent in our treatment of the CES production function in Section 7. 
                                                 
13 The derivation of (10) is straightforward.  Taking the time derivative of (9a,) combining with (9b), and recalling (8), 
immediately yields the equilibrium growth rate of consumption.  Assuming the balanced growth path along which 
consumption and capital grow at the same rate, (4’) yields the consumption-capital ratio consistent with this assumption. 
14 The relationships between the two sets of elasticities are found in the Appendix, (A.11a) and (A.11b).  These 
relationships have been utilized in deriving the second pair of equalities in (12a) and (12b). 
15 This means that solving explicitly for the optimal government expenditure shares may involve solving a highly 
nonlinear pair of equations that may, or may not, yield closed-form solutions.  
10 3.2  Optimally set fractions of e and g (first-best optimum) 
It is straightforward to show that when e and g are optimally chosen leads to two further 
optimality conditions that can be conveniently summarized by 
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   (13b) 
from which we infer that for either form of public input, its qualitative impact on the welfare of the 
representative agent is identical to its qualitative effect on the growth rate.  It immediately follows 
from (12)-(13) that the growth-maximizing expenditure shares given in (12) are also welfare-
maximizing.  The equilibrium optimal growth rate is thus given by 
   
1 1 ** * * * 1
(1 ) ( , )
G E eg e n g n
ε ε ϕ φρ
σ
− − ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦  
   
1 1 ** * * 1
(1 ) ( , )
G E
EG E G nn
ε ε η ηφ η η ρ
σ
− − ⎡ =− − − ⎣⎤ ⎦
*
     (14) 
where   are the growth and welfare-maximizing expenditure shares, as given in (12), and 
* , eg
** , EG η η  
are the corresponding production elasticities, evaluated at the optimum.  Equations (12) and (14) 
thus comprise the first-best optimum.
16  We therefore conclude that the well known Barro (1990) 
proposition pertaining to the coincidence of growth and welfare maximizing government 
expenditures extends to both types of public input, and indeed extends beyond the Cobb-Douglas 
production function to the quite general specification adopted in (1).
17
                                                 
16 We should emphasize that precisely the same first-best equilibrium as defined by (12) and (14) would obtain if, instead 
of the two stage optimization procedure we have adopted, we were to choose the optimal levels of government 
expenditure directly by maximizing intertemporal utility, (5), subject to the resource constraint, (4), and the production 
function, (1). 
17 However, its robustness should not be overstated.  Turnovsky (2000) discusses a number of important circumstances 
in which it ceases to hold.  These include: (i) the introduction of risky technology, (ii) the government input as a stock 
rather than as a flow, (iii) adjustment costs associated with investment. 
11 4.  Equilibrium in the decentralized economy 
  We turn now to the representative agent in the decentralized economy.  The individual’s 
production function is given by equation (1).  As noted, the individual has to pay an income tax, τ , a 
lump-sum tax, l, as well as the user fee, q, if he uses the excludable part of the government input, all 
of which he takes as parametrically given.  For the present we abstract from the monopolistic pricing 
of the excludable public input, delaying our discussion of this aspect until Section 7.  Both public 
inputs are subject to relative congestion as represented by equation (2).  In contrast to the social 
planner, the individual does not realize the negative external effect of capital accumulation.  Thus, 
given the homogeneity, the production function as perceived by the individual is given by 
  ,, ,
EG E kk E k G k
yF k E G k
KK k K k K
εε ε ε
φ




     (15) 
The individual's optimization problem is to choose the time paths for individual 
consumption, capital accumulation, and his use of the excludable public input to maximize utility as 
given by equation (5) subject to the rate of capital accumulation 
           ( 1 6 )   (1 ) k ycq El τ =− − − − 
and output y as given by (15).  The new feature is the appearance of the user fee in the agent’s 
budget constraint (16).  The optimality conditions are 
    c
σ λ
− =         ( 1 7 a )  
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         ( 1 7 c )  
Equation (17a) coincides with (9a) for the social planner, while equation (17b) now equates the after 
tax marginal product of private capital to the rate of return on consumption.  The equilibrium 
12 marginal product of private capital, r, derived from equation (15) is given by
18
   ( (.) 1 (1 ) (1 ) EE GG
y
r
k ) φ εη εη
∂
≡ = −− −−
∂
      ( 1 8 )  
Since individuals ignore the consequences of their own activities on the aggregate economy the 
individually perceived marginal product of capital includes an externality. Agents overestimate the 
resulting marginal product if the public input is congested, that is if  0 E ε >  and/or  0 G ε > .  Equation 
(17c) is the formal statement of exclusion. As individuals have to pay directly for the use of the 
excludable public input, E, they determine their optimal usage by equating its net marginal revenue 
product to its marginal cost,  , (the user fee).    q
  We assume that the government sets the user fee to ensure that the demand for the excludable 
public good, chosen by the private sector equals the supply, set by the government.  Using the 
relationship,  , the market equilibrium in the decentralized economy is thus formally 
represented by the following two equations 
Ee n y =
   [
1
(1 ) (.)(1 (1 ) (1 ) EE GG ] ϕ τφ ε η ε η ρ
σ
= − −− −− −      ( 1 9 a )  
  (1 ) E qne τ η −=         (19b) 
Given the expenditure shares e,  g, and tax rate, τ , these two equations jointly determine the 
equilibrium growth rate, ϕ , and the market-clearing user fee, q.  Rewriting (19b) in the form 
   
(1 ) E ne E
q
τ η −
==         ( 1 9 b ’ )  
highlights the equilibrating role the user fee plays in equating the private demand for the excludable 
public input (the left hand side) to the government determined supply (the right hand side). 
  To illustrate the budgetary consequences of a shift from a distortionary income tax to a user 
fee, we focus on the Cobb-Douglas production function, when  E η  is constant.  In this case (19b) 
requires  ( ) 0 E dq ne d ητ =− > , which from (19a) implies an unambiguous reduction in the growth 
rate.  This has consequences for both the government’s primary deficit, given by the right hand of 
                                                 
18 See the Appendix for the derivation of this equation. 
13 (3), as well as the present value of its deficit, as the economy evolves along its equilibrium growth 
path.  Substituting for (6a), (6b), and (8) into (3), and using (19b), the short-run primary deficit and 
its present value (the intertemporal primary deficit) are, respectively 
     [ ] (.) (1 ) E Dn k eg φ ττ η =+ − − −      ( 2 0 a )  




( . )( 1 ) ( . )( 1
(1 ) 1 1 (1 )
EE rt nk e g nk e g
VD ed t
rr
τ ) φ ττ ηφ ττ η
τϕ σ τρ σ
∞ −− +−−− +−−−
≡= =
−− − −+ ∫  (20b) 
With the productive elasticity being less than 1 [see (12a)], a reduction in the income tax raises the 
short-run deficit unambiguously, while the effect on the intertemporal deficit satisfies 
   () sgn sgn ( 1) (1 )( 1) E
V
re g ρη σ
τ




Since 1 , for a switch toward a user tax to reduce the intertemporal deficit it is necessary for 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to exceed unity 
eg >+
(1 σ < , a condition that contradicts the 
bulk of the empirical evidence.
19  Thus, we conclude that, at least for the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, a switch toward a user fee is unlikely to augment government revenue.  Additional revenue 
stimulated by a higher growth rate over time will be dominated by the reduction of the current 
revenue flow. 
5.  General characterization of optimal tax and user cost 
From a welfare point of view optimal fiscal policy should allow for the provision of the 
optimal quantities of E and G, and internalize, if necessary, any negative external effect of non-
optimal capital accumulation that may otherwise prevail in the decentralized economy.  This 
involves three objectives: (i) the attainment of the optimal growth rate; (ii) maintaining market 
equilibrium for the excludable public input, and (iii) ensuring government solvency.  We will show 
that (i) and (ii) can be attained by the appropriate choice of income tax and user fee.  Given these 
                                                 
19 The empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are quite far-ranging, consensus estimates 
probably lying in the range 0.3- 0.4.  However, we should note that estimates in excess of unity have been obtained; see 
e.g. Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003), in which case we cannot rule out the possibility that the switch to the user 
tax may reduce the intertemporal deficit.  
14 choices and the revenues they generate, equation (3) determines the necessary choice of lump-sum 
tax to maintain solvency.  We begin with the analysis for optimally set expenditure shares and then 
turn to the case where the government sets e and g arbitrarily. 
5.1  Government sets e and g optimally 
In this case the expenditure shares are determined in accordance with equations (12), that is, 
*
E e η =  and 
*
G g η = .  Thus the market clearing condition, (19b), simplifies to 
    1 qn τ −=         (19b”) 
Equating the equilibrium growth rate (19a) to the first-best optimal growth rate (15), and using (20) 
yields the first-best optimal income tax rate and user fee as functions of the optimally set 
government expenditure shares (or equivalently the corresponding partial production elasticities, 
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   (21b) 
Note again that, except in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
** * ,  EG eg η η ==  vary 
with the quantities of the public inputs used, as well as with the congestion parameters.
20  The 
presence of congestion associated with either input causes individuals to overestimate the social 
marginal product of capital, generating an incentive to over-accumulate private capital.  The 
resulting growth rate in the decentralized economy becomes sub-optimally high.  Hence, a positive 
tax on income is required in order to reduce the incentive to accumulate capital, and thus correct for 
this externality. At the same time, the income tax reduces the after-tax marginal product of the 
excludable public input, E.  As the individual demand for E requires equating the (after-tax) 
marginal product of E to its marginal cost, an increase in τ  reduces the marginal product, thus 
                                                 
20 We shall illustrate this aspect in the context of the CES production function in Section 8, below. 
15 reducing individual demand.  In order to ensure that demand for the excludable good is maintained 
equal to the optimally set supply, the government decreases the user fee as consequence of an 
increase inτ .  We may summarize this with: 
Proposition 1:  Assume that the government sets the expenditure shares of the 
excludable and non-excludable public goods optimally.  The optimal income tax and 
the optimal user fees are functions of the partial production elasticities of the inputs, 
together with their respective congestions.  The existence of congestion in either good 
raises the income tax and reduces the user fee. 
The result that congestion favors an income tax is consistent with Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) 
conclusion, although in their model they interpret the income tax as an approximation to a user fee 
and note its superiority over lump-sum taxation.  In our case the comparison is between the income 
tax and an explicit user fee.   
The mechanism described above, according to which the income tax internalizes the 
congestion, has one counter-intuitive implication, namely that congestion in the non-excludable 
public good reduces the equilibrium user fee for the excludable good.  Intuitively, one might have 
expected that congestion in the non-excludable good would raise the demand for the excludable 
input, thereby raising its user fee.  On the other hand, the fact that congestion in the excludable good, 
by reducing the marginal product of that input, reduces the user fee is quite intuitive. 
5.2  Government sets g and e arbitrarily 
  This case brings out the relationship between the financing instruments, on the one hand, and 
the deviations of the actual expenditure shares from their respective optima, on the other.  We now 
consider the second-best growth rate of the centrally planned economy, as determined in equation 
(10) as a reference.  In order for the growth rate in the decentralized economy, (19a), to replicate this 
second best optimum, we require 
   ( 1( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) EE GG eg ) τ εη εη −− = − − − − −       ( 2 2 )  
16 Moreover, given the government’s choice of its public inputs, q must be set in accordance with (19b) 
so as to ensure goods market clearance for the excludable public input.  Solving (22) and (19b), the 
corresponding second-best optimal income tax rate and user fee are now given by 
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−− ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ −− −− ⎝⎠ η
      (23b) 
In this case the second-best optimal tax and user fee depend upon actual expenditure shares as well 
as the production elasticities and congestion parameters.  There are now two externalities that need 
to be corrected: (i) the degree of congestion, and (ii) the deviations in the actual expenditures,   and 
g from their respective optima.  Because of the fact that the productive elasticities are functions of 
the actual and optimal expenditure shares, the comparison of 
e
ˆˆ ,q τ  with the first-best optimal values, 
 is not in general practical, although it becomes feasible in the case of the CES production 
function, discussed in Section 8, below.   
** ,q τ
One comparison of some interest is that  
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      (24b) 
Holding the fraction of government expenditures fixed, an increase in the productivity of either 
public input (as measured by the productive elasticities,  , EG η η ) raises output and the tax base.  This 
permits the second-best tax rate to be reduced, while the higher productivity yielding enhanced 
productive benefits, allows a higher user fee to be charged.  But since the higher productive elasticity 
induces more usage of either input, thereby reducing its marginal productivity this in general raises 
the first-best tax rate and reduces the optimal usage fee.  The exception is the polar case where both 
inputs are pure public goods, in which case (21) implies 
** 0, 1 q τ == n , independent of the 
productive elasticities.  
17 6.  Optimally Set Expenditure Shares: Budgetary Implications 
It is evident that the degrees of congestion associated with the two types of public input have 
important consequences for their mode of financing and therefore for government budget balance.  
To focus on this important issue we assume that the government sets both expenditure ratios at their 
respective optima, namely 
*
E e η = , and 
*
G g η = , in accordance with (12).  To sustain this 
equilibrium, the revenue-generating fiscal instruments must satisfy (21).  The issue we want to 
address is the extent to which each type of public good can be individually financed entirely from its 
designated source of revenue – the non-excludable input from tax revenues, the excludable input 
from the user fee – as well as the extent to which aggregate expenditure on the two public goods can 
be financed out of both revenue sources, taken together.   
Given   agents, total revenues earned from these two sources equal  n ny n q E τ +  and we are 
concerned with the extent to which this is compatible with total public expenditure GE + .  
Recalling the expenditure rules, (6a), (6b), and with expenditure shares set optimally, the 
government can balance its budget using these two instruments alone (i.e. without lump-sum tax 
financing) if and only if  
           ( 2 5 )    
** nqe e g τ += +
*
As we shall see, the extent to which this is possible depends crucially upon the degrees of congestion 
and the optimal fiscal policy they induce.   
To address this issue, it is convenient to rewrite (21a) and (21b) in the form 
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   ( 2 6 c )  
18 These expressions highlight how the relationship between revenues and expenditures depends upon 
the degree of congestion.  From these equations we can derive the following 
Proposition 2: (i)    The revenue generated by the user fee suffices to finance 
the excludable public input if and only if the optimal tax rate is zero.  This occurs if 
and only if neither public input is subject to congestion.   
(ii)  The total revenue generated suffices to finance total public expenditure if and 
only if the optimal  ratios of the two inputs satisfies  ( )
** (1 ) GE eg ε ε =− .  In the case 
that congestion is uniform across the two inputs,  EG ε εε = = , the government budget 
(25) will balance if and only if 
** * ( geg ε =+ ) , i.e. if and only if the degree of 
congestion equals the fraction of non-excludable in total public expenditure.  
Further insight is obtained by discussing special cases and the following will be considered. 
 (i)   0 EG ε ε == :  In case of absence of congestion in either public input, as noted, the optimal 
fiscal policy (21a) and (21b) reduces to 
              ( 2 7 a )  
* 0 τ =




=          (27b) 
With a zero income tax rate, the after-tax marginal product of E is not distorted and the optimal user 
fee equals the marginal cost of providing E.  Substituting these optimal tax rates in (25) we see that 
while the expenditure of the excludable good is self-financing (consistent with Proposition 3), the 
expenditure on the non-excludable good is not.  The provision of these optimally supplied public 
goods is sustainable only as long as the government has at its disposal (positive) lump-sum taxation, 
that may be employed to finance the non-excludable good. 
(ii)   1 EG ε ε == :  Suppose that both public inputs are proportionally congested.  In this case, optimal 
fiscal policy, (21a) and (21b), becomes 
            ( 2 8 a )  
*** egg τ =+ >
*






       (28b) 
The striking aspect of this result is that tax revenues alone suffice to finance the entire production of 
the optimally provided public inputs.  Thus, although we introduce excludability, it is the income tax 
that internalizes the external effect for both parts of the public input, reducing the incentive that 
would otherwise exist to over-accumulate capital.  In addition, the government receives positive user 
fee revenues (that would, however, be insufficient to finance the entire amount of E).  These 
revenues are the consequence of the individual demand for E as described in (19b).  The positive 
income tax rate reduces the after-tax marginal product of E.  If e is set optimally the market clearing 
condition of E requires a user fee that is below the optimal level, but still positive.  Thus, since total 
revenues generated exceed the expenditure required, the excess revenues should be rebated via a 
growth-neutral fiscal instrument, such as a (negative) lump-sum tax. 
(iii) 0, 1 EG ε ε == : We now assume that the excludable part is not congested, whereas the non-
excludable part of the public production input is proportionally congested.  The optimal tax rate and 
user fee satisfy 
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−− ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ n
<        (29b) 
which upon substitution can be seen to satisfy the balanced budget condition (25).  While the 
revenue generated by the user fee is insufficient to finance the excludable part of the public input, E, 
the income tax revenue exceeds the amount necessary to finance the non-excludable component, G.  
Indeed, the excess tax revenues generated equal precisely the amount necessary to make up the 
shortfall to finance fully the excludable public input.  Thus with tax revenues in part subsidizing the 
excludable input, the government can balance its budget without the need to impose a lump-sum tax. 
(iv) 1, 0 EG ε ε == :  Finally, we assume that the excludable part of the public production input is 
proportionally congested, while the non-excludable part is a pure public good.  The optimal tax rate 
20 and fee then are given by 
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which implies that 
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     (31) 
Again, the revenues from the user fee are insufficient to finance the optimal amount of the 
excludable good.  But now, excess tax revenues may or may not arise.  Several cases need to be 
distinguished.  First, if  , then the tax revenues are sufficient to provide exactly the 
efficient amount of the non-excludable good, G.  If  , tax revenues are insufficient to 
finance even the non-excludable part of the public input.  In both these cases there is a budgetary 
shortfall.  Only if   does the government generate sufficient tax revenues to finance the 
the non-excludable good.  In this case, there will still be a budgetary shortfall as long as 
.  The total budget will be exactly balanced without an additional instrument if 
and only if  .  If   excess total revenues are generated, leaving resources 
available that can be redistributed back to the agents via a lump-sum rebate. 
** * (1 ) eg g =−
** * (1 ) eg g <−
** * (1 ) eg g >−
** * (1 ) (1 ) gg ee −>−
*
* * * eg =
** (1 ) ge g −> >
  These results highlight how the equilibrium user fee declines with the degree of congestion in 
the excludable input.  This is a consequence of the assumed exogeneity of congestion, and because 
the individual demand for E requires the marginal revenue and marginal cost of E to be equalized.  
As the two fiscal instruments, τ  and q are linked together [see equation (19b)], it is the income tax 
rate that internalizes the external effects of capital utilization.  Thus, the optimal income tax rate is 
positive if either public good is subject to congestion, reducing the after-tax marginal product of E. 
Thus   must be reduced below marginal cost for the market clearing condition (19b) to be met.   
* q
We may summarize these special cases as follows: 
Proposition 3: (i)  If  0 EG ε ε = =  the expenditure of the excludable input is 
21 financed entirely by the optimal user fee, whereas the non-excludable part must be 
financed via a growth neutral instrument. 
(ii)  If  1 EG ε ε ==  the optimal income tax and user fee yield excess revenues that 
can be rebated in a growth neutral manner. 
(iii)  If  0, 1 EG ε ε ==  the government budget (25) is balanced.  The excess tax 
revenue exactly covers the shortfall generated by the fee revenue. 
(iv)  If  1, 0 EG ε ε == , whether the income tax revenues suffice to finance the 
revenue shortfall associated with the user fee depends upon the relative sizes of the 
optimal expenditure shares. 
7. Monopoly  Pricing 
Thus far we have assumed that the government provides the excludable part of infrastructure 
by entering the market for final output and selling at a competitive market-clearing price to the 
private sector.  But being the sole supplier of the public production inputs, it is reasonable to analyze 
the consequences of it acting as a monopolist.  As Brito and Oakland (1980) note, abundant 
examples of monopoly provision exist, (e.g. highways, airports, parks, and museums), so that this is 
clearly an important case to consider.    
Assume now that the government recognizes that it faces a downward sloping aggregate 
demand function for the excludable good,  () qq E = ,  0 q′< .  The marginal revenue from providing E 
monopolistically is  .(1 ) q ω − , where ω  is the degree of monopoly power defined by  , 1 Eq ω δ = − , 
where  , Eq δ  denotes the price elasticity of demand for E.  Analogous to equation (19b), market 
clearance in the provision of E now requires 
   ( 1 ) ( 1 E nq e ) τ η −=− ω         ( 3 2 )  
This relation, together with the growth rate given in equation (19a), describes the market equilibrium 
under monopolistic behavior.   
Again, we analyze the optimal fiscal policy in the sense of replicating the first-best optimal 
22 growth rate in equation (10) for the optimally set expenditure shares,   and  .  It is immediately 
evident that the optimal income tax rate is unaffected by monopoly pricing and thus coincides with 
that given in (21a).  In contrast, the optimal user fee is directly influenced by monopolistic behavior.  
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 (21b’)  
The optimal user fee increases with an increase in the degree of monopoly and exceeds  , 
as determined in (21b).  Analogous to (26), we may express the optimal fiscal policy in the form   
* q
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and thus 
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   (26c’) 
Despite not affecting the optimal tax, the presence of monopoly power still plays an important role 
in the overall structure of optimal fiscal policy.  Most significantly, we see that the user fee generates 
more revenue under monopolistic pricing, thus reducing the potential amount of lump-sum tax 
financing required to balance the budget.  Moreover, it can now generate more revenue than is 
required to fully finance the excludable public input.  Recalling (21a), (26b’) implies  
   




<   according to whether 
*   ω τ
>
<  
We can further identify from (26c’) a critical degree of monopoly power,  , such that if 
* 1 ω < ω  
exceeds 
* ω , total revenues will always cover total expenditure costs.
21   
                                                 
21 
** * * * ((1 ) ) ((1 ) (1 ) ) 1 GE G E ge g e ωε ε ε ε =− − − + − < , which varies with congestion and the optimal expenditure ratios. 
23 We may summarize the impact of monopoly pricing with 
Proposition 4: (i)  It is possible for certain degrees of monopoly to realize 
excess revenues out of the user fee, something that is not possible if the government 
provides the excludable part of public input under competitive pricing.. 
(ii) The user fee can fully finance the  provision of the excludable input if 
* ω τ = .  If 
the degree of monopoly exceeds (falls short of) the optimal income tax, the financing 
contribution of the fee exceeds (falls short of) the financing requirement for the 
excludable input. 
(iii) There is a critical degree of monopoly power 
* 1 ω < , such that if 
* ω ω > , total 
revenues from the income tax and user fee will always exceed total expenditure costs. 
8.  The CES Production Function 
We now specify the production technology to be a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function that is homogeneous of degree one in the three inputs.  Specializing the 
production function in this way not only facilitates the study of optimal fiscal policy, but it is also 
convenient for analyzing the consequences of different degrees of substitution between the inputs for 
optimal fiscal policy. Thus the production function (1) becomes 
 
1
 0< 1, 0 1, 0 1, 1 SS yk GE
ξξ ξ ξ αβγ α β γ α β γ
− −− − ⎡⎤ =+ + < < < < < + + ⎣⎦ =    (1’) 
where   1( 1 ) θ ξ ≡+ ,  0 θ << ∞ ,  denotes the elasticity of substitution between the three inputs.   
Utilizing the congestion function (2), the expenditure shares as given by (6), the equilibrium 
production function, (7), can be expressed in the linear “AK form” 
   
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 1
G E yg n e n
ξ ξε ξε ξξ ξ αβ γ
−− −− −− − ⎡ =− − ⎣ k ⎤ ⎦     (7’) 
8.1  Centrally planned economy 
As in Section 3, we begin by summarizing the equilibrium growth rate in the centrally 
planned economy.  For arbitrarily set expenditure shares the equilibrium (second-best) growth rate is 
24   ()
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 1
(1 ) 1
G E eg gn en
ξ ξε ξε ξξ ξ ϕ αβ γ
σ
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 ρ    (10’) 
Following the procedure employed for the general production function in Section 3, we can verify 
that the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing expenditure shares coincide, being given by 
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respectively.  In addition, we can compute the production elasticities directly from (1’) together with 
the congestion functions (2) to obtain 
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G E
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ξ       ( 3 3 )  
Combining (13’) and (33) yields 
   
*1 *1 () ;    () GE gg ee
ξ ξ ηη
+− + − ==
ξ ξ       ( 3 4 )  
These expressions bring out the point made earlier that in general the production elasticity 
depends upon the usage of the productive input, as well as the degree of congestion.  The exception 
is the Cobb-Douglas production function,  0 ξ = , when  ,  GE η βη γ = = .  Note further from (34) that 
when g and e are set optimally, this equation implies 
* ,  GE g ηη
* e = = , consistent with (12). 
Dividing the two expressions in (13’) implies 
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      ( 3 5 )  
from which we see that the optimal ratio of non-excludable to excludable public inputs depends 
upon (i) their productivity, (ii) the elasticity of substitution, and (iii) their differential degrees of 
congestion.  We may note the following three important cases: 
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so that the ratio of their optimal usage depends only upon their differential congestion. 
 (ii)  If  0 ξ =  and thus  1 θ =  (Cobb-Douglas production function), then 









so that the ratio of their optimal usage depends only upon their relative productivity and is 
independent of the degree of congestion, 
 (iii)  If  1 ξ =−  and thus  (perfect substitutes)  θ →∞
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Thus in the case where the two public inputs are perfect substitutes, the entire public input should 
take the form of the one having the higher “congestion-adjusted” productivity. 
8.2 Decentralized  economy 
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    (36) 
Taking the derivative of (36) with respect to k, in equilibrium the agent’s perceived private marginal 
physical product of capital is 









1 (.) k yk
ξ η αφ ≡≡ .  Omitting for simplicity the monopolistic pricing effect, the market 
equilibrium in the decentralized economy is again given by (19), the only difference being in the 
specification of the function  (.) yk φ ≡ . 
  The second-best optimal fiscal policy is again specified by (23).  But in light of relationships 
(34) we can express it in the following intuitive way: 
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Written in this way makes quite explicit how the optimal fiscal policy is correcting for two 
distortions (i) congestion, and (ii) the deviations of the actual expenditure shares from their 
respective optima.  From (37a) and (37b) we can derive:
 22
Proposition 5:  (i) If both g and e are set at their respective optima,   then 
as given in (21). 
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9. Conclusions 
Many public goods are characterized by two key attributes: rivalry and excludability.  While 
the role of rivalry has been widely considered in the growth literature, excludability has not.  In this 
paper we have introduced both non-excludable and excludable public inputs into a simple 
endogenous growth model.  Our focus has been on deriving the equilibrium growth rate and 
designing the optimal tax and user-cost tax structure.  Our results emphasize the role of congestion 
in determining this optimal structure and the consequences this has in turn for the government’s 
budget.  The latter consists of fee and tax revenues that are used to finance the entire public 
production input and that may or may not suffice to satisfy the financing requirements for the entire 
input.  If no congestion arises, a user fee set at marginal cost yields the optimal amount of the 
excludable public input while the non-excludable input must be financed via a growth neutral tax.  If 
                                                 
22The results of Proposition 5 continue to hold if instead of (1’) output is determined by a two-level production of the 
form . 
1 yA k X
α α − = , 
1
(1 ) SS XG E
ζ ξξ ββ
− −− ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦ . 
27 either form of the public input is congested it is optimal to levy a positive income tax to internalize 
the external effect.  At the same time, due to the interdependence between the optimal fees and 
income taxes, the optimal user fee is reduced thus decreasing the corresponding fee revenues.  Then, 
the financing contribution of the fees is not sufficient to provide the optimal amount of the 
excludable input.  This result changes if the government passes on user fees at marginal costs but 
makes use of monopoly pricing that might be accomplished if the government is the unique supplier.  
It is then possible for certain degrees of monopoly to realize excess revenues out of the user fee that 
might replace (non-distortionary) taxes in order to finance the entire infrastructure. 
We end with two caveats and suggestions for further research on this important topic.  First, 
by introducing government inputs as flows into production, the equilibrium we derive always places 
the economy on its balanced growth path.  This has the analytical advantage of simplifying the 
characterization of the optimal tax and pricing structure.  But much of the recent literature analyzing 
the role of publicly provided productive inputs recognizes that they should more appropriately be 
treated as stocks, rather than flows, thereby introducing public as well as private capital.  This 
observation was made early on by Arrow and Kurz (1970) and is also recognized in some of the 
more contemporary endogenous growth models; see e.g. Futagami, et al. (1993) and Turnovsky 
(1997).  The effect of this is to introduce transitional equilibrium dynamics, suggesting that the 
optimal financing policies will involve time-varying tax rates and user fees, as the decentralized 
economy seeks to track the first-best optimal path.
 23   
Another limitation of the analysis is that it does not fully capture the linkage between 
congestion and the user fee.  It takes the degree of congestion as given and determines the 
corresponding equilibrium user fee.  One of the motivations for imposing a user fee is to reduce 
congestion, in which case the equilibrium level of congestion would become endogenously 
determined along with the user fee.  To extend the model in this direction would be an important 
step. 
                                                 
23 For example, Turnovsky (1997) shows how the optimal tax rate is time-varying in the case where public capital is non-
excludable. 
28 Appendix 
A.1  Relationship between General Production Function and the Intensive Form 
  As the production function  
            ( A . 1 )   ( , , SS yF k E G = )
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 1 in its three arguments,  , Euler’s theorem implies  , , SS kE G
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Substituting from the relationships 
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, we can rewrite (A.2) 
as  
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23 1
G E F en F gn y Fk
ε ε − − −− =       ( A . 3 )  
Now take the total differential of (A.1), to obtain 
      12 3 SS dy Fdk F dE F dG =+ +
which holding   constant, implies  ,, neg




1 F en F gn dy Fdk
ε ε − − −− =       ( A . 4 )  
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) imply dy y dk k =  so that any production function having the above 
homogeneity properties can be written in the “AK form” 
            ( A . 5 )  
11 (,
NG ye ng n
εε φ
−− = ) k
as represented by (8) in the text. 
A.2 Relationships  between  elasticities 




EG Fk F F




=         ( A . 6 )  
which in elasticity form can be written as 
   1
SS kE G η ηη ++=          ( A . 7 )  
Using the fact 
1 1  and 
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SS E En G Gn
ε ε − − ==  
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S GG η η = , so that (A.7) can be written in the equivalent form    
    1 kEG η ηη ++=         ( A . 8 )  
  To derive the relationships between the elasticities in the aggregate quantities and in the 
shares, rewrite equation (A.1) as 
           ( A . 1 ’ )  
1 1 (, , )
G E y F k en y gn y
ε ε − − =
Taking derivatives of this with respect to  , respectively, we obtain  , eg




































>       (A.10b) 
Using the above fact that 
















and analogously for  G η , (A.10a) and (A.10b) imply 




















=        (A.11b) 
A.3  Derivation of marginal physical product of capital in decentralized economy 















       (A.12) 
Imposing the equilibrium condition Kn k = , and using the fact that 
S EE ε ε =  and 
S GG ε ε = , this 
simplifies to 
























        (A.13) 
Using the above definitions of elasticities, (A.8), and the relationship  (.) y φ =  in (8), (A.13) 
immediately yields the expression in the text, namely 
    ( 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) EE GG
y
k ) φ εη εη
∂
=− − − −
∂
      (A.14) 
 
A3 References 
Arrow K. J. and M. Kurz (1970). Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy, 
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.  
Aschauer, D. A. (1989). “Is Public Expenditure Productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics 23, 
177-200. 
Azzimanti-Renzo, M., P. Sarte, and J. Soares (2003). “Optimal Public Investment and Time 
Consistency” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper 03-10. 
Barro, R. J. (1990). “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of 
Political Economy 98, 103–125. 
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992). “Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth”, Review 
of Economic Studies 59, 645-661. 
Baxter, M. and R.G. King (1993). “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium,” American Economic 
Review 83, 315-334.  
Brennan, H.G. and C. Walsh (1985). “Private Markets in (Excludable) Public Goods: A Re-
examination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, 811-819. 
Brito, D. L. and W.H. Oakland (1980). “On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public 
Goods,” American Economic Review vol. 70, 691–704. 
Bruce, N. and S.J. Turnovsky (1999). “Budget Balance, Welfare, and the Growth Rate: ‘Dynamic 
Scoring’ of the Long-run Government Budget,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 31, 
162-186. 
Burns, M.E. and C. Walsh (1981). “Market Provision of Price-Excludable Public Goods: A General 
Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy 89, 166-191. 
Cassou, S. P. and K. Lansing (1998). “Optimal Fiscal Policy, Public Capital and the Productivity 
Slowdown”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 911-935. 
Cornes, R., and T. Sandler (1996). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Dewees, D.N. (2002). “Pricing Municipal Services: The Economics of User Fees,” Canadian Tax 
Journal 50, 586-599. 
R1 Edwards, J. H. Y. (1990). “Congestion Function Specification and the “Publicness” of Local Public 
Goods,” Journal of Urban Economics 27, 80-96.  
Eicher, T. and S.J. Turnovsky (2000). “Scale, Congestion and Growth,” Economica 67, 325–346. 
Fisher, W.H. and S.J. Turnovsky (1998). “Public Investment, Congestion, and Private Capital 
Accumulation,” Economic Journal 108, 399-413. 
European Commission (2001). White paper: European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide, 
European Communities, and Luxembourg. 
Fraser, C.D. (1996). “On the Provision of Excludable Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics 
60, 111-130. 
Futagami, K., Y. Morita, and A. Shibata (1993). “Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth 
Model with Public Capital,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95, 607-625. 
Glomm, G. and B. Ravikumar (1994). “Public Investment in Infrastructure in a Simple Growth 
Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 18, 1173-1187. 
Glomm, G. and B. Ravikumar (1997), “Productive Government Expenditures and Long-Run 
Growth”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21, 183-204. 
Ireland, P.N. (1994). “Supply-side Economics and Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 33, 559-571. 
Ott, I. (2001). “Congestion, Excludability, and Endogenous Growth,”, ifo-Studien 4, 453-467. 
Rebelo, S. (1991). “Long-run Policy Analysis and Long-run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 
99, 500-521. 
Thompson, E.A. (1974). “Taxation and National Defense,” Journal of Political Economy 82, 755-
82. 
Turnovsky, S.J. (1996). “Optimal Tax, Debt, and Expenditure Policies in a Growing Economy,” 
Journal of Public Economics 60, 21–44. 
Turnovsky, S.J. (1997). “Fiscal Policy in a Growing Economic with Public Capital,”   
Macroeconomic Dynamics 1, 615–639. 
Turnovsky, S. J. (2000). Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2
nd Ed, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Vissing-Jørgensen, A., and O.P Attanasio (2003). “Stock-market Participation, Intertemporal 
R2 Substitution, and Risk-aversion,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 93, 
383-391. 
Wassmer, R. W. and R.C. Fisher (2002). “Interstate Variation in the Use of Fees to Fund K–12 
Public Education,” Economics of Education Revenue, 21, 87–100. 
 
R3 